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Abstract—A growing body of research leverages social net-
work based trust relationships to improve the functionality of
the system. However, these systems expose users’ trust rela-
tionships, which is considered sensitive information in today’s
society, to an adversary.
In this work, we make the following contributions. First, we
propose an algorithm that perturbs the structure of a social
graph in order to provide link privacy, at the cost of slight
reduction in the utility of the social graph. Second we define
general metrics for characterizing the utility and privacy of
perturbed graphs. Third, we evaluate the utility and privacy of
our proposed algorithm using real world social graphs. Finally,
we demonstrate the applicability of our perturbation algorithm
on a broad range of secure systems, including Sybil defenses
and secure routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several proposals have been put forward
that leverage user’s social network trust relationships to
improve system security and privacy. Social networks have
been used for Sybil defense [33], [32], [5], [20], [28], secure
routing [13], [19], [16], secure reputation systems [29], miti-
gating spam [18], censorship resistance [27], and anonymous
communication [4], [22].
A significant barrier to the deployment of these systems
is that they do not protect the privacy of user’s trusted
social contacts. Information about user’s trust relationships
is considered sensitive in today’s society; in fact, existing
online social networks such as Facebook, Google+ and
Linkedin provide explicit mechanisms to limit access to this
information. A recent study by Dey et al. [6] found that
more than 52% of Facebook users hide their social contact
information.
Most protocols that leverage social networks for system
security and privacy either explicitly reveal users’ trust re-
lationships to an adversary [5] or allow the adversary to
easily perform traffic analysis and infer these trust relation-
ships [32]. Thus the design of these systems is fundamentally
in conflict with the current online social network paradigm,
and hinders deployment.
In this work, we focus on protecting the privacy of users’
trusted contacts (edge/link privacy, not vertex privacy) while
still maintaining the utility of higher level systems and
applications that leverage the social graph. Our key insight
in this work is that for a large class of security applications
that leverage social relationships, preserving the exact set
of edges in the graph is not as important as preserving the
graph-theoretic structural differences between the honest and
dishonest users in the system.
This insight motivates a paradigm of structured graph
perturbation, in which we introduce noise in the social graph
(by deleting real edges and introducing fake edges) such that
the local structures in the original social graph are preserved.
We believe that for many applications, introducing a high
level of noise in such a structured fashion does not reduce
the overall system utility.
A. Contributions
In this work, we make the following contributions.
• First, we propose a mechanism based on random walks
for perturbing the structure of the social graph that
provides link privacy at the cost of a slight reduction
in application utility (Section IV).
• We define a general metric for characterizing the utility
of perturbed graphs. Our utility definition considers the
change in graph structure from the perspective of a
vertex. We formally relate our notion of utility to global
properties of social graphs, such as mixing times and
second largest eigenvalue modulus of graphs, and ana-
lyze the utility properties of our perturbation mechanism
using real world social networks (Section V).
• We define several metrics for characterizing link privacy,
and consider prior information that an adversary may
have for de-anonymizing links. We also formalize the
relationship between utility and privacy of perturbed
graphs, and analyze the privacy properties of our per-
turbation mechanism using real world social networks
(Section VI).
• Finally, we experimentally demonstrate the real world
applicability of our perturbation mechanism on a broad
range of secure systems, including Sybil defenses and
secure routing (Section VII). In fact, we find that for
Sybil defenses, our techniques are of interest even
outside the context of link privacy.
II. RELATED WORK
Work in this space can be broadly classified into two
categories: (a) mechanisms for protecting the privacy of links
between labeled vertices, and (b) mechanisms for protecting
node/graph privacy when vertices are unlabeled. The focus of
this work is on protecting the privacy of relationships among
labeled vertices.
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A. Link privacy between labeled vertices
There are two main mechanisms for preserving link pri-
vacy between labeled vertices. The first approach is to
perform clustering of vertices and edges, and aggregate them
into super vertices (e.g., [10] and [34]). In this way, infor-
mation about corresponding sub-graphs can be anonymized.
While these clustering approaches permit analysis of some
macro-level graph properties, they are not suitable for black-
box application of existing social network based applications,
such as Sybil defenses. The second class of approaches aim
to introduce perturbation in the social graph by adding and
deleting edges and vertices. Next, we discuss this line of
research in more detail.
Hay et al. [11] propose a perturbation algorithm which
applies a sequence of k edge deletions followed by k random
edge insertions. Candidates for edge deletion are sampled
uniformly at random from the space of existing edges in
graph G, while candidates for edge insertion are sampled
uniformly at random from the space of edges not in G. The
key difference between our perturbation mechanism and that
of Hay et al. is that we sample edges for insertion based on
the structure of the original graph (as opposed to random
selection). We will compare our approach with that of Hay
et al. in Section VI.
Ying and Wu [31] study the impact of Hay et al.’s
perturbation algorithms [11] on the spectral properties of
graphs, as well as on link privacy. They also propose a
new perturbation algorithm that aims to preserve the spectral
properties of graphs, but do not analyze its privacy properties.
Korolova et al. [12] show that link privacy of the overall
social network can be breached even if information about
the local neighborhood of social network nodes is leaked
(for example, via a look-ahead feature for friend discovery).
B. Anonymizing the vertices
Although the techniques described above reveal the iden-
tity of the vertices in the social graph but add noise to the
relationships between them, there have been various works
in the literature that aim at anonymizing the identities of the
nodes in the social network. This line of research is orthog-
onal to our goals, but we describe them for completeness.
The straightforward approach of just removing the identi-
fiers of the nodes before publishing the social graph does not
always guarantee privacy, as shown by Backstrom et. al. [2].
To deal with this problem, Liu and Terzi [14] propose a
systematic framework for identity anonymization on graphs,
where they introduce the notion of k-degree anonymity. Their
goal is to minimally modify the graph by changing the
degrees of specially-chosen nodes so that the identity of each
individual involved is protected. An efficient version of their
algorithm was recently implemented by Lu et al. [15].
Another notion of graph anonymity in social networks is
presented by Pei and Zhou [35]: A graph is k-anonymous if
for every node there exist at least k−1 other nodes that share
isomorphic neighborhoods. This is a stronger definition than
the one in [14], where only vertex degrees are considered.
Zhou and Pei [36] recently introduced another notion
called l-diversity for social network anonymization. In this
case, each vertex is associated with some non-sensitive at-
tributes and some sensitive attributes. Maintaining the privacy
of the individual in this scenario is based on the adversary not
being able (with high probability) to re-identify the sensitive
attribute values of the individual.
Finally, Narayanan and Shmatikov [23] show some of the
weaknesses of the above anonymization techniques,propose
a generic way for modeling the release of anonymized social
networks and report on successful de-anonymization attacks
on popular networks such as Flickr and Twitter.
C. Differential privacy and social networks
Sala et al. [26] use differential privacy (a more elaborate
tool of adding noise) to publish social networks with privacy
guarantees. Given a social network and a desired level of
differential privacy guarantee, they extract a detailed structure
into degree correlation statistics, introduce noise into the
resulting dataset, and generate a new synthetic social network
with differential privacy. However, their approach does not
preserve utility of the social graph from the perspective of
a vertex (since vertices in their graph are unlabeled), and
thus cannot be used for many real world applications such
as Sybil defenses.
Also, Rastogi et al. [25] introduce a relaxed notion of
differential privacy for data with relationships so that more
expressive queries (e.g., joins) can be supported without
hurting utility very much.
D. Link privacy preserving applications
X-Vine [19] proposes to perform DHT routing using social
links, in a manner that preserves the privacy of social links.
However, the threat model in X-Vine excludes adversaries
that have prior information about the social graph. Thus in
real world settings, X-Vine is vulnerable to the Narayanan-
Shmatikov attack [23]. Moreover the techniques in X-Vine
are specific to DHT routing, and cannot be used to design a
general purpose defense mechanism for social network based
applications, which is the focus of this work.
III. BASIC THEORY
Before we introduce our perturbation mechanism, we
present some notation and background on graph theory
needed to understand the paper.
Let us denote the social graph as G = (V,E), comprising
the set of vertices V (wlog assume the vertices have labels
1, . . . , n), and the set of edges E, where |V | = n and |E| =
m. The focus of this paper is on undirected graphs, where
the edges are symmetric. Let AG denote the n×n adjacency
matrix corresponding to the graph G, namely if (i, j) ∈ E,
then Aij = 1, otherwise Aij = 0.
A random walk on a graph G starting at a vertex v is a
sequence of vertices comprising a random neighbor v1 of v,
then a random neighbor v2 of v1 and so on. A random walk
on a graph can be viewed as a Markov chain. We denote
the transition probability matrix of the random walk/Markov
chain as P , given by:
Pij =
{
1
deg(i) if (i, j) is an edge in G ,
0 otherwise .
(1)
where deg(i) denotes the degree of the vertex i. At any
given iteration t of the random walk, let us denote with pi(t)
the probability distribution of the random walk state at that
iteration (pi(t) is a vector of n entries). The state distribution
after t iterations is given by pi(t) = pi(0) · P t, where pi(0)
is the initial state distribution. The probability of a t-hop
random walk starting from i and ending at j is given by P tij .
For irreducible and aperiodic graphs (which undirected
and connected social graphs are), the corresponding Markov
chain is ergodic, and the state distribution of the random walk
pi(t) converges to a unique stationary distribution denoted by
pi. The stationary distribution pi satisfies pi = pi · P .
For undirected and connected social graphs, we can see
that the probability distribution pii =
deg(i)
2·m satisfies the
equation pi = pi · P , and is thus the unique stationary
distribution of the random walk.
Let us denote the eigenvalues of A as λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn,
and the eigenvalues of P as ν1 ≥ ν2 ≥ . . . ≥ νn. The
eigenvalues of both A and P are real. We denote the second
largest eigenvalue modulus (SLEM) of the transition matrix
P as µ = max(|ν2|, |νn|). The eigenvalues of matrices A
and P are closely related to structural properties of graphs,
and are considered utility metrics in the literature.
IV. STRUCTURED PERTURBATION
A. System Model and Goals
For the deployment of secure applications that leverage
user’s trust relationships, we envision a scenario where these
applications bootstrap user’s trust relationships using existing
online social networks such as Facebook or Google+.
However, most applications that leverage this information
do not make any attempt to hide it; thus an adversary can
exploit protocol messages to learn the entire social graph.
Our vision is that OSNs can support these applications
while protecting the link privacy of users by introducing noise
in the social graph. Of course the addition of noise must
be done in a manner that still preserves application utility.
Moreover the mechanism for introducing noise should be
computationally efficient, and must not present undue burden
to the OSN operator.
We need a mechanism that takes the social graph G as an
input, and produces a transformed graph G′ = (V,E′), such
that the vertices in G′ remain the same as the original input
graph G, but the set of edges is perturbed to protect link
privacy. The constraint on the mechanism is that application
utility of systems that leverage the perturbed graph should
be preserved. Conventional metrics of utility include degree
sequence and graph eigenvalues; we will shortly define a
general metric for utility of perturbed graphs in the following
section. There is a tradeoff between privacy of links in the
social graph and the utility derived out of perturbed graphs.
As more and more noise is added to the social graph, the link
privacy increases, but the corresponding utility decreases.
B. Perturbation Algorithm
Let t be the parameter that governs how much noise we
wish to inject in the social graph. We propose that for each
node u in graph G, we perturb all of u’s contacts as follows.
Suppose that node v is a social contact of node u. Then we
perform a random walk of length t − 1 starting from node
v. Let node z denote the terminus point of the random walk.
Our main idea is that instead of the edge (u, v), we will
introduce the edge (u, z) in the graph G′. It is possible that
the random walk terminates at either node u itself, or that
node z is already a social contact of u in the transformed
graph G′ (due to a previously added edge). To avoid self
loops and duplicate edges, we perform another random walk
from vertex v until a suitable terminus vertex is found, or
we reach a threshold number of tries, denoted by parameter
M . For undirected graphs, the algorithm described so far
would double the number of edges in the perturbed graphs:
for each edge (u, v) in the original graph, an edge would
be added between a vertex u and the terminus point of the
random walk from vertex v, as well as between vertex v
and the terminus point of the random walk from vertex u.
To preserve the degree distribution, we could add an edge
between vertex u and vertex z in the transformed graph with
probability 0.5. However this could lead to low degree nodes
becoming disconnected from the social graph with non-trivial
probability. To account for this case, we add the first edge
corresponding to the vertex u with probability 1, while the
remaining edges are accepted with a reduced probability to
preserve the degree distribution. The overall algorithm is
depicted in Algorithm 1. The computational complexity of
our algorithm is O(m).
C. Visual depiction of algorithm
For our evaluation, we consider two real world social
network topologies (a) Facebook friendship graph from the
New Orleans regional network [30]: the dataset comprises
63,392 users that have 816,886 edges amongst them, and (b)
Facebook interaction graph from the New Orleans regional
network [30]: the dataset comprises 43,953 users that have
182,384 edges amongst them. Mohaisen et al. [21] found
that pre-processing social graphs to exclude low degree
nodes significantly changes the graph theoretic characteris-
tics. Therefore, we did not pre-process the datasets in any
way.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 1. Facebook dataset link topology (a) Original graph (b) Perturbed, t=5 (c) t=10 (d) t=15, and (e) t=20. The color coding in (a) is derived using a
modularity based community detection algorithm. For the remaining figures, the color coding of vertices is same as in (a). We can see that short random
walks preserve the community structure of the social graph, while introducing a significant amount of noise.
Algorithm 1 Transform(G, t,M): Perturb undirected graph
G using perturbation t and maximum loop count M .
G′ = null;
foreach vertex u in G
let count = 1;
foreach neighbor v of vertex u
let loop = 1;
do
perform t− 1 hop random walk from vertex v;
let z denote the terminal vertex of the random walk;
loop++;
until (u = z ∨ (u, z) ∈ G′) ∧ (loop ≤M )
if loop ≤M
if count = 1
add edge (u, z) in G′
else
let deg(u) denote degree of u in G;
add edge (u, z) in G′ with probability 0.5×deg(u)−1deg(u)−1 ;
count++;
return G′;
Figure 1 depicts the original Facebook friendship graph,
and the perturbed graphs generated by our algorithm for
varying perturbation parameters, using a force directed al-
gorithm for depicting the graph. The color coding of nodes
in the figure was obtained by running a modularity based
community detection algorithm on the original Facebook
friendship graph, which yielded three communities. For the
perturbed graphs, we used the same color for the vertices
as in the original graph. This representation allows us to
visually see the perturbation in the community structure of
the social graph. We can see that for small values of the
perturbation parameter, the community structure (related to
utility) is strongly preserved, even though the edges between
vertices are randomized. As the perturbation parameter is
increased, the graph looses its community structure, and
eventually begins to resemble a random graph.
Figure 2 depicts a similar visualization for the Facebook
interaction graph. In this setting, we found two communities
using a modularity based community detection algorithm in
the original graph. We can see a similar trend in the Facebook
interaction graph as well: for small values of perturbation
algorithm, the community structure is somewhat preserved,
even though significant randomization has been introduced in
the links. In the following sections, we formally quantify the
utility and privacy properties of our perturbation mechanism.
V. UTILITY
In this section, we develop formal metrics to characterize
the utility of perturbed graphs, and then analyze the utility
of our perturbation algorithm.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 2. Facebook dataset interaction topology (a) Original graph (b) Perturbed t=5 (c) t=10 (d) t=15, and (e) t=20. We can see that short random walks
preserve the community structure of the social graph, while introducing a significant amount of noise.
A. Metrics
One approach to measure utility would be to consider
global graph theoretic metrics, such as the second largest
eigenvalue modulus of the graph transition matrix P. How-
ever, from a user perspective, it may be the case that the
users’ position in the perturbed graph relative to malicious
users is much worse, even though the global graph properties
remain the same. This motivates our first definition of the
utility of a perturbed graph from the perspective of a single
user.
Definition 1: The vertex utility of a perturbed graph G’
for a vertex v, with respect to the original graph G, and an
application parameter l is defined as the statistical distance
between the probability distributions induced by l hop ran-
dom walks starting from vertex v in graphs G and G’.
V U(v,G,G′, l) = Distance(P lv(G), P
l
v(G
′)) (2)
P lv denotes the v
′th row of the matrix P l. The parameter
l is linked to higher level applications that leverage social
graphs. For example, Sybil defense mechanisms exploit large
scale community structure of social networks, where the
application parameter l ≥ 10. For other applications such
as recommendation systems, it may be more important to
preserve the local community characteristics, where l could
be set to a smaller value.
Random walks are intimately linked to the structure of
communities and graphs, so it is natural to consider their use
when defining utility of perturbed graphs. In fact, a lot of
security applications directly exploit the trust relationships
in social graphs by performing random walks themselves,
such as Sybil defenses and anonymous communication.
There are several ways to define statistical distance be-
tween probability distributions [3]. In this work, we consider
the following three notions. The total variation distance
between two probability distributions is a measure of the
maximum difference between the probability distributions for
any individual element.
Variation Distance(P,Q) = ||P −Q||tvd = sup
i
|pi − qi|
(3)
As we will discuss shortly, the total variation distance is
closely related to the computation of several graph properties
such as mixing time and second largest eigenvalue mod-
ulus. However, the total variation distance only considers
the maximum difference between probability distributions
corresponding to an element, and not the differences in prob-
abilities corresponding to other elements of the distribution.
This motivates the use of Hellinger distance, which is defined
as:
Hellinger Distance(P,Q) =
1√
2
·
√
(
n∑
i=1
(
√
(pi)−
√
(qi))
2) (4)
The Hellinger distance is related to the Euclidean distance
between the square root vectors of P and Q. Finally, we
also consider the Jenson-Shannon distance measure, which
takes an information theoretic approach of averaging the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between P and Q, and between
Q and P (since Kullback-Leibler divergence by itself is not
symmetric).
Jenson-Shannon Distance(P,Q) =
1
2
·
n∑
i=1
pi log(
pi
qi
) +
1
2
·
n∑
i=1
qi log(
qi
pi
) (5)
Using these notions, we can compute the utility of the
perturbed graph with respect to an individual vertex (ver-
tex utility). Note that a lower value of V U(v,G,G′, l)
corresponds to higher utility (we want distance between
probability distributions over original graph and perturbed
graph to be low). Using the concept of vertex utility, we can
define metrics for overall utility of a perturbed graph.
Definition 2: The overall mean vertex utility of a per-
turbed graph G’ with respect to the original graph G, and an
application parameter l is defined as the mean utility for all
vertices in G. Similarly the max vertex utility (worst case) of
a perturbed graph G’ is defined by computing the maximum
of the utility values over all vertices in G.
V Umean(G,G
′, l) =
∑
v∈V
Distance(P lv(G), P
l
v(G
′))
|V | (6)
V Umax(G,G
′, l) = max
v∈V
Distance(P lv(G), P
l
v(G
′)) (7)
The notion of max vertex utility is particularly interest-
ing, specially in conjunction with the use of total variation
distance. This is because of its relationship to global graph
metrics such as mixing times and second largest eigenvalue
modulus, which we demonstrate next. Our analysis shows the
generality of our formal definition for utility.
B. Metrics Analysis
Towards this end, we first introduce the notion of mixing
time of a Markov process. The mixing time of a Markov
process is a measure of the minimum number of steps needed
to converge to its unique stationary distribution. Formally, the
mixing time of a graph G is defined as:
τG() = max
v
min(t|P tv(G)− pi| < ) (8)
The following two theorems illustrate the bound on global
properties of the perturbed graph, using the global properties
of the original graph, and the utility metric. To improve
readability of the paper, we defer the proofs of these theorems
to the Appendix.
Theorem 1: Let us denote the max (worst case) ver-
tex utility distance between the perturbed graph G’ and
the original graph G by V Umax(G,G′, l), computed as
V Umax(G,G
′, l) = maxv∈V V U(v,G′, G, l)). Then we
have that τG′(+ V Umax(G,G′, τG()) ≤ τG().
Theorem 1 relates the mixing time of the perturbed graph
using the mixing time of the original graph, and the max
vertex utility metric, for application parameter l = τG().
Theorem 2: Let us denote the second largest eigenvalue
modulus (SLEM) of transition matrix PG of graph G as µG.
We can bound the SLEM of a perturbed graph G’ using the
mixing time of the original graph, and the worst case vertex
utility distance between the graphs as follows:
1−
log n+ log( 1+V Umax(G,G′,τG() )
τG()
≤ µG′ ≤
2τG()
2τG() + log(
1
2+2V Umax(G,G′,τG()
)
Theorem 2 relates the second largest eigenvalue modulus
of the perturbed graph, using the mixing time of the original
graph, and the worst case vertex utility metric for application
parameter l = τG().
These theorems show the generality of our utility defini-
tions. Mechanisms that provide good utility (have low values
of V Umax), introduce only a small change in the mixing time
and SLEM of perturbed graphs.
C. Algorithm Analysis
Our above results show the general relationship between
our utility metrics and global graph properties (which hold for
any perturbation algorithm). Next, we analyze the properties
of our proposed perturbation algorithm.
First, we empirically compute the mean vertex utility of
the perturbed graphs (V Umean), for varying perturbation
parameters and varying application parameters. Figure 3
depicts the mean vertex utility for the Facebook interaction
and friendship graphs using the Jenson-Shannon information
theoretic distance metric . We can see that as the perturbation
parameter increases, the distance metric increases. This is not
surprising, since additional noise will increase the distance
between probability distributions computed from original and
perturbed graphs. We can also see that as the application
parameter l increases, the distance metric decreases. This
illustrates that our perturbation algorithm is ideally suited for
security applications that rely on local or global community
structures, as opposed to applications that require exact
information about one or two hop neighborhoods. We can
see a similar trend when using Hellinger distance to compute
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Fig. 3. Jenson-Shannon distance between transient probability distributions for original graph and transformed graph using (a) Facebook interaction
graph (b) Facebook wall post graph. We can see that as the original graph is perturbed to a larger degree, the distance between original and transformed
transient distributions increases, decreasing application utility.
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Fig. 4. Hellinger distance between transient probability distributions for original graph and transformed graph using (a) Facebook interaction graph
(b) Facebook wall post graph. We can see that even with different notions of distance between probability distributions (Hellinger/Jenson-Shannon), the
distance between original graph and perturbed graph monotonically increases depending on the perturbation degree.
the distance between probability distributions, as shown in
Figure 4.
Theorem 3: The expected degree of each node after the
perturbation algorithm is the same as in the original graph:
∀v ∈ V,E(deg(v)′) = deg(v), where deg(v)′ denotes the
degree of vertex v in G′.
Proof: On an expectation, half the degree of any node
v is preserved via outgoing random walks from v in the
perturbation process. To prove the theorem, we need to show
that for each node is the terminal point of deg(v)/2 random
walks in the perturbation mechanisms (on average). From the
time reversibility property of the random walks, we have that
P tijpii = P
t
jipij . Thus for any node i, the incoming probability
of a random walk starting from node j is P tji = P
t
ij
deg(i)
deg(j) ,
i.e., it is proportional to the node degree of i. Thus the
expected number of random walks terminating at node i in
the perturbation algorithm is given by
∑
v∈V deg(v)P
t−1
vi .
This is equivalent to
∑
v∈V Piv
t−1deg(i) = deg(i). Since
half of these walks will be added to the graph G’ on average,
we have that E(deg(v)′) = deg(v).
Corollary 1: The expected value of the largest
eigenvalue of the transformed graph is bounded as
max(davg,
√
(dmax)) ≤ E(λ′1) ≤ dmax
From the Perron-Frobenius theorem, we have that the
largest eigenvalue of the graph is related to the notion of
average graph degree as follows:
max(d′avg,
√
(d′max)) ≤ λ′1 ≤ d′max (9)
Taking expectation on the above equation, and using the
previous theorem yields the corollary.
Next, we show experimental results validating our theorem.
Figure 5 depicts the node degrees of the original graphs, and
expected node degrees of the perturbed graphs, corresponding
to all nodes in the Facebook interaction and friendship
graphs. In this figure, the points in a vertical line for different
perturbed graphs correspond to the same node index. We
can see that the degree distributions are nearly identical,
validating our theoretical results.
Theorem 4: Using our perturbation algorithm, the mixing
time of the perturbed graphs is related to the mixing time of
the original graph as follows: τG()t ≤ E(τG′()) ≤ τG().
Theorem 4 bounds the mixing time of the perturbed
graph using the mixing time of the original graph and the
perturbation parameter t. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
Finally, we compute the mixing time of the original and
perturbed graphs using simulations. Figure 6 depicts the total
variation distance between random walks of length x and
the stationary distribution, for the original and perturbed
graphs. 1 We can see that as the perturbation parameter
increases, the total variation distance (and the mixing time)
1Variation distance has a slight oscillating behavior at odd and even steps
of the random walk; this phenomenon is also observed in Figure 8.
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Fig. 5. Degree distribution of nodes using (a) Facebook interaction graph (b) Facebook wall post graph. We can see that the expected degree of each
node after the perturbation process remains the same as in the original graph.
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Fig. 6. Total variation distance as a function of random walk length using (a) Facebook interaction graph (b) Facebook wall post graph. We can see that
increasing the perturbation parameter of our algorithm reduces the mixing time of the graph.
decreases. Moreover, for small values of the perturbation
parameter, the difference from the original topology is small.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the variation distance
for the Facebook friendship graph is orders of magnitude
smaller that the Facebook interaction graph. This is because
the Facebook interaction graphs are a lot sparser, resulting in
slow mixing.
VI. PRIVACY
We now address the question of understanding link privacy
of our perturbation algorithm. We use several notions for
quantifying link privacy, which fall into two categories (a)
quantifying exact probabilities of de-anonymizing a link
given specific adversarial priors, and (b) quantifying risk of
de-anonymizing a link without making specific assumptions
about adversarial priors. We also characterize the relationship
between utility and privacy of a perturbed graph.
A. Bayesian formulation for link privacy
Definition 3: We define the privacy of a link L (or a
subgraph) in the original graph, as the probability of existence
of the link (or a subgraph), as computed by the adversary,
under an optimal attack strategy using its prior information
H: P (L|G′, H)
Note that low values of link probability P (L|G′, H) cor-
respond to high privacy. We cast the problem of computing
the link probability as a Bayesian inference problem. Using
Bayes theorem, we have that:
P (L|G′, H) = P (G
′|L,H) · P (L|H)
P (G′|H) (10)
In the above expression, P (L|H) is the prior probability of
the link. In Bayesian inference, P (G′|H) is a normalization
constant that is typically difficult to compute, but this is not
an impediment for the analysis since sampling techniques can
be used (as long as the numerator of the Bayesian formulation
is computable upto a constant factor) [17], [9]. Our key
theoretical challenge is to compute P (G′|L,H).
To compute P (G′|L,H), the adversary has to consider all
possible graphs Gp, which have the link L, and are consistent
with background information H . Thus, we have that:
P (G′|L,H) =
∑
Gp
P (G′|Gp) · P (Gp|L,H) (11)
The adversary can compute P (G′|Gp) using the knowl-
edge of the perturbation algorithm; we assume that the ad-
versary knows the full details of our perturbation algorithm,
including the perturbation parameter t. Observe that given
Gp, edges in G′ can be modeled as samples from the
probability distribution of t hop random walks from vertices
in Gp. Thus we can compute P (G′|Gp) as follows:
We can compute P (G′|Gp) using the t hop transition
probabilities of vertices in Gp.
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Fig. 7. Cumulative distribution of link probability P (L|G′, H) (x-axis is
logscale) under worst case prior H = G − L using a synthetic scale free
topology. Small probabilities offer higher privacy protection.
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In general, the number of possible graphs Gp that have L
as a link and are consistent with the adversary’s background
information can be very large, and the computation in Equa-
tion 11 then becomes intractable.
For evaluation, we consider a special case of this defini-
tion: the adversary’s prior is the entire original graph without
the link L (which is the link for which we want to quantify
privacy). Observe that this is a very powerful adversarial
prior; we use this prior to shed light on the worst-case link
privacy using our perturbation algorithm. Under this prior,
we have that:
P (L|G′, G− L) = P (G
′|L,G− L) · P (L|G− L)
P (G′|G− L)
=
P (G′|G) · P (L|G− L)
P (G′|G− L)
=
P (G′|G) · P (L|G− L)∑
l P (G
′|G− L+ l) (13)
Using G − L as the adversarial prior constraints the set
of possible Gp to a polynomial number. However, even
in this setting, we found that the above computation is
computationally expensive (> O(n3)) using our real world
social networks. Thus to get an understanding of link privacy
in this setting, we generated a 500 node synthetic scale-free
topology using the preferential attachment methodology of
Nagaraja [22]. The parameters of the scale free topology
was set using the average degree in the Facebook inter-
action graph. Figure 7 depicts the cumulative distribution
for link probability (probability of de-anonymizing a link,
P (L|G′, H)) in this setting (worst case prior) for the syn-
thetic scale-free topology. We can see that there is significant
variance in the privacy protection received by links in the
topology: for example, using perturbation parameter t = 2,
40% of the links have a link probability less than 0.1 (small
is better), while 30% of the links have have a probability of
1 (can be fully de-anonymized). Note that this is a worst case
analysis, since we assume that an attacker knows the entire
original graph except the link in question. Furthermore, even
in this setting, as the perturbation parameter t increases, the
privacy protection received by links substantially improves:
for example, using t = 5, all of the links have a link
probability less than 0.01, while 70% of the links have a
link probability of less than 0.001. Thus we can see that
even in this worst case analysis, our perturbation mechanism
offers good privacy protection.
Comparison with Hay et al [11]: previous work proposed
a perturbation approach where k real edges are deleted and k
fake edges are introduced at random. Even considering k =
m/2 (which would substantially hurt utility, for example, by
introducing large number of edges between Sybils and honest
users), 50% of the edges in the perturbed graph are real edges
between users; for these edges, P (L|G′) = 0.5. Here we can
see the benefit of our perturbation mechanism: by sampling
fake edges based on the structure of the original graph, we
are able to significantly improve link privacy without hurting
utility.
B. Relationship between privacy and utility
Intuitively, there is a relationship between link privacy and
the utility of the perturbed graphs. Next, we formally quantify
this relationship.
Theorem 5: Let the maximum vertex utility of the graph
(over all vertices) corresponding to an application parameter
l be V Umax(G,G′, l). Then for any two pair of vertices A
and B, we have that P (LAB |G′) ≥ f(δ), where f(δ) denotes
the prior probability of two vertices being friends given that
they are both contained in a δ hop neighborhood, and δ is
computed as δ = min k : P kAB(G
′)− V Umax(G,G′, k) > 0.
Utility measures the change in graph structure between
original and perturbed graphs. If this change is small (high
utility), then an adversary can infer information about the
original graph given the perturbed graph. For a given level
of utility, the above theorem demonstrates a lower bound on
link privacy.
We defer the proof of the above theorem to the Appendix.
The above theorem is a general theorem that holds for all
perturbed graphs. To shed some intuition, we specifically
analyze the lower bounds on privacy for our perturbation
algorithm (where parameter t governs utility), using the
transition probability between A and B in the perturbed graph
G′ as a feature to assign probabilities to nodes A and B of
being friends in the original graph G. We are interested in
the quantity P (LAB | P kAB(G′) > x), for different values of
k. Using Bayes’ theorem, we have that:
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Fig. 8. Median transition probability between two vertices in transformed graph when (a) two vertices were neighbors (friends) in the original graph and
(b) two vertices were not neighbors in the original graph, for the Facebook interaction graph.
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Fig. 9. Complimentary cumulative distribution for PkAB(G
′) using (a) perturbation parameter t = 2, and (b) perturbation parameter t = 5, and (c)
perturbation parameter t = 10 for the Facebook interaction graph.
P (LAB | P kAB(G′) > x) =
P (P kAB(G
′) > x | LAB) · P (LAB)
P (P kAB(G
′) > x)
(14)
Also, we have that:
P (P kAB(G
′) > x) = P (P kAB(G
′) > x | LAB) · P (LAB)+
P (P kAB(G
′) > x | LAB) · P (LAB)
(15)
where LAB denotes the event when vertices A and B don’t
have a link.
To get some insight, we computed the probability dis-
tributions P (P kAB(G
′)|LAB) and P (P kAB(G′)|LAB) using
simulations on our real world social network topologies.
Figure 8 depicts the median value of the respective probabil-
ity distributions, as a function of parameter k, for different
perturbation parameters t, using the Facebook interaction
graph. We can see that the median transition probabilities
are higher for the scenario where two users are originally
friends (as opposed to the setting where they are not friends).
We can also see that the difference between median transition
values in the two scenarios is higher when (a) the perturbation
parameter t is small, and (b) the parameter K (random walk
length) is small. This difference is related to the privacy of
the link - larger the difference, greater the loss in privacy.
The insight from this figure is that for small perturbation
parameters, the closer two nodes are to each other in the
perturbed graph, the higher their chances of being friends in
the original graph.
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Fig. 10. Cumulative distribution of link probability P (L|G′, H) for
the Facebook interaction graph. Smaller probabilities offer higher privacy
protection
Next, we consider the full distribution of transition prob-
abilities (as opposed to only the median values discussed
above). Figure 9(a) depicts the complimentary cumulative
distribution (P kAB(G
′) > x) using perturbation parameter
t = 2 for the Facebook interaction graph. Again, we can see
that when A and B are friends, they have higher transition
probability to each other in the perturbed graph, compared
to the scenario when A and B are not friends. Moreover, as
the value of k increases, the gap between the distributions
becomes smaller. Similarly, as the value of t increases, the
gap between the distributions becomes smaller, as depicted in
Figures 9(b-c). We can use these simulation results to com-
pute the probabilities in Equation 14. One way to analyzing
the lower bound on link privacy would be to choose a uniform
prior for vertices being friends in the original graph, i.e.,
P (LAB) =
m
(n2)
. Correspondingly, P (LAB) = 1− P (LAB).
Figure 10 depicts the cumulative distribution of link
probability computed using the above methodology, for the
Facebook interaction graph. We can see the variance in
privacy protection received by links in the topology. Using
t = 2, 80% of the links have a link probability of less
than 0.1. Increasing perturbation parameter t significantly
improves performance; using t = 3, 95% of the links have
a link probability less than 0.1, and 90% of the links have
a link probability less than 0.01. In summary, our analysis
shows that a given level of utility translates into a lowerbound
on privacy offered by the perturbation mechanism.
C. Risk based formulation for link privacy
The dependence of the Bayesian inference based privacy
definitions on the prior of the adversary motivates the for-
mulation of new metrics that are not specific to adversarial
priors. We first illustrate a preliminary definition of link
privacy (which is unable to account for links to degree 1
vertices), and then subsequently improve it.
Definition 4: We define the structural impact (SI) of a link
L in graph G with respect to a perturbation mechanism M ,
as the statistical distance between probability distributions
of the output of the perturbation mechanism (i.e., the set
of possible perturbed graphs) when using (a) the original
graph G as an input to the perturbation mechanism, and (b)
the graph G - L as an input to the perturbation mechanism.
Let P (G′ = M(G)) denote the probability distribution of
perturbed graphs G′ using the perturbation mechanism M
and input graph G. A link has  SI-privacy if the statistical
distance ||P (G′ =M(G))− P (G′ =M(G− L))|| < .
Intuitively, if the SI of a link is high, then the perturbation
process leaks more information about that link. On the other
hand, if the SI of a link is low, then the perturbed graph G’
leaks less information about the link.
As before, we consider the total variation distance as our
distance metric between probability distributions. Observe
that the links in graphs G’ are samples from the probability
distribution P tv(G), for v ∈ V . So we can bound the
difference in probability distributions of perturbed graphs
generated from G and G-L, by the worst case total vari-
ation distance between probability distributions P tv(G) and
P tv(G− L), over all v ∈ V , i.e. V Umax(G,G− L, t).
Note that our preliminary attempt at defining link privacy
above does not accommodate links where either of its end-
points have degree 1, since removal of that link disconnects
the graph. This is illustrated in Figure 11, which depicts the
cumulative distribution of  SI link privacy values. We can
see that approximately 30% and 20% of links in the Facebook
interaction graph and friendship graphs respectively do not
receive any privacy protection under this definition (because
they are connected to degree 1 vertices). For the remaining
links, we can see a similar qualitative trend as before:
increasing the perturbation parameter t significantly improves
link privacy. To overcome the limitations of this definition,
we propose an alternate formulation based on the notion of
link equivalence.
Definition 5: We define the structural equivalence (SE)
between a link L’ with a link L in graph G with respect to a
perturbation mechanism M, as the statistical distance between
probability distributions of the output of the perturbation
mechanism, when using (a) the original graph G as an input
to the perturbation mechanism, and (b) the graph G - L +
L’ as the input to the perturbation mechanism. A link L has
K-anonymous  SE privacy, if there exist at least K links L’,
such that ||P (G′ =M(G))−P (G′ =M(G−L+L′))|| < .
Observe that this definition of privacy is able to account
for degree 1 vertices, since they can become connected
to the graph via the addition of other alternate links L’.
For our experiments, we limited the number of alternate
links explored to 1000 links (for computational tractability).
Figure 12 depicts the cumulative distribution of anonymity
set sizes for links using  = 0.1 for the Facebook interaction
and friendship graphs. For t = 2 we see a very similar trend
as in the previous definition, where a non-trivial fraction of
links do not receive much privacy. Unlike the previous setting
however, as we increase the perturbation parameter t, the
anonymity set size for even these links improves significantly.
Using t = 10, 50% and 70% of the links in the interaction
and friendship graphs respectively, achieved the maximum
tested anonymity set size of 1000 links.
Connection with differential privacy [8]: there is an inter-
esting connection between our risk based privacy definitions
and differential privacy. A differentially private mechanism
adaptively adds noise to the system to ensure that all user
records in a database (links in our setting) receive a threshold
privacy protection. In our mechanism, we are adding a fixed
amount of noise (governed by the perturbation parameter
t), and observing the variance in  and anonymity set size
values.
VII. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our
perturbation mechanism to social network based systems.
A. Secure Routing
Several peer-to-peer systems perform routing over so-
cial graph to improve performance and security, such as
Sprout [16],Tribler [24], Whanau [13] and X-Vine [19]. Next,
we analyze the impact of our perturbation algorithm on the
utility of Sprout.
1) Sprout: Sprout is a routing system that enhances the
security of conventional DHT routing by leveraging trusted
social links when available. For example, when routing
towards a DHT key, if leveraging a social link makes forward
progress in the DHT namespace, then the social link is used
for routing. The authors of Sprout considered a linear trust
decay model, where a users’ social contacts are trusted with
probability f (set to 0.95 in [16]), and the trust in other users
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Fig. 11. Cumulative distribution of  SI link privacy for (a) Facebook interaction graph and (b) Facebook link graph. Note that the SI privacy definition
is not applicable to links for which either of the vertex has degree of 1, since removing that link disconnects the graph.
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Fig. 12. Cumulative distribution of K-anonymity set size for  = 0.1 SE link privacy using (a) Facebook interaction graph and (b) Facebook friendship
graph.
TABLE I
PATH RELIABILITY USING SPROUT FOR A LINEAR TRUST DECAY MODEL.
Facebook interaction graph Facebook friendship graph
Mechanism Reliability Mechanism Reliability
Original 0.110 Original 0.140
t=3 0.101 t=3 0.126
t=5 0.101 t=5 0.121
t=10 0.096 t=10 0.118
Chord 0.075 Chord 0.072
decreases as a linear function of the shortest path distance
between the users (a decrement of 0.05 is used in [16]). The
decrement is bounded by a value that reflects the probability
of a random user in the network being trusted (set to 0.6 in
[16]).
The reliability of a DHT lookup in sprout is defined as
the probability of all users in the path being trusted. Table I
depicts the reliability of routing using a single DHT lookup
in Sprout, for the original and the perturbed topologies.
We used Chord as the underlying DHT system. For each
perturbation parameter, our results were averaged over 100
perturbed topologies. We can see that as the perturbation
parameter increases, the utility of application decreases. For
example, using the original Facebook interaction topology,
the reliability of a single DHT path in sprout is 0.11, which
drops to 0.10 and 0.096 when using perturbed topologies with
parameters t = 5 and t = 10 respectively. However, even
when using t = 10, the performance is better as compared
with the scenario where social links are not used for routing
(Chord’s baseline performance of 0.075). We can see similar
results for the Facebook friendship graph as well.
B. Sybil detection
In a Sybil attack [7], a single user or an entity emulates the
behavior of multiple identities in a system. Many systems are
built on the assumption that there is a bound on the fraction of
malicious nodes in the systems. By being able to insert a large
number of malicious identities, an attacker can compromise
the security properties of such systems. Sybil attacks are a
powerful threat against both centralized as well as distributed
systems, such as reputation systems, consensus and leader
election protocols, peer-to-peer systems, anonymity systems,
and recommendation systems.
A wide body of recent work has proposed to leverage trust
relationships embedded in social networks for detecting Sybil
attacks [33], [32], [5], [20], [28]. However, in all of these
mechanisms, an adversary can learn the trust relationships
in the social network. Next, we show that our perturbation
algorithm preserves the ability of above mechanisms to detect
Sybils, while protecting the privacy of the social network trust
relationships.
1) SybilLimit: We use SybilLimit [32] as a representative
protocol for Sybil detection, since it is the most popular and
well understood mechanism in the literature. SybilLimit is
a probabilistic defense, and has both false positives (honest
users misclassified as Sybils) and false negatives (Sybils
misclassified) as honest users.
We compared the performance of running SybilLimit on
original graph, and on the transformed graph, for varying
perturbation parameters. For each perturbation parameter, we
averaged the results over 100 perturbed topologies. Figure 13
depicts the percentage of honest users validated by Sybil-
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Fig. 13. SybilLimit % validated honest nodes as a function of SybilLimit random route length for (a) Facebook interaction graph (b) Facebook wall post
graph. We can see that for a false positive rate of 1− 2%, the required random route length for our perturbed topologies is a factor of 2− 3 smaller as
compared with the original topology. Random route length is directly proportional to number of Sybil identities that can be inserted in the system.
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Fig. 14. Attack edges in perturbed topologies as a function of attack edges in the original topology. We can see that there is a marginal increase in the
number of attack edges in the perturbed topologies. The attack edges are directly proportional to the number of Sybil identities that can be inserted in the
system.
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Fig. 15. Number of Sybil identities accepted by SybilInfer as a function of number of compromised nodes in the original topology. We can see that there
is a significant decline in the number of Sybil identities using our perturbation algorithms.
Limit using the original graph and perturbed graphs, as a
function of the SybilLimit random route length (application
parameter w). For any value of the SybilLimit random
route length, the percentage of honest nodes accepted by
SybilLimit is higher when using perturbed graphs. This is
because our perturbation algorithms reduce the mixing time
of the graph. In fact, for a false positive percentage of
1− 2% (99-98% accepted nodes), the required length of the
SybilLimit random routes is a factor of 2 − 3 smaller as
compared to the original topology. SybilLimit random routes
are directly proportional to the number of Sybil identities that
can be inserted in the system.
This improvement in the number of accepted honest nodes
(reduction in false positives) comes at the cost of increase in
the number of attack edges between honest users and the
attacker. Figure 14 depicts the number of attack edges in
the perturbed topologies, for varying values of attack edges
in the original graph. We can see that as expected, there is
a marginal increase in the number of attack edges in the
perturbed topologies.
Remark: The number of Sybil identities that an adversary
can insert is given by S = g′ ·w′. We note that the marginal
increase in the number of attack edges g′ is offset by the
reduced length of the SybilLimit random route parameter w
(for any desired false positive rate), thus achieving compa-
rable performance with the original social graph. In fact, for
perturbed topologies, since the required random route length
in SybilLimit is halved for a false positive rate of 1 − 2%,
and the increase in the number of attack edges is less than
a factor of two, the Sybil defense performance has improved
using our perturbation mechanism. Thus for Sybil defenses,
our perturbation mechanism is of independent interest, even
without considering the benefit of link privacy. We further
validate this conclusion using another state-of-art detection
mechanism called SybilInfer.
2) SybilInfer: We compared the performance of running
SybilInfer on real and perturbed topologies. Figure 15 depicts
the optimal number of Sybil identities that an adversary can
insert before being detected by SybilInfer, as a function
of real compromised and colluding users. Again, we can
see that the performance of perturbed graphs is better than
using original graphs. This is due to the interplay between
mixing time of graphs and the number of attack edges in
the Sybil defense application. Our perturbation mechanism
significantly reduces the mixing time of the graphs, while
suffering only a marginal increase in the number of attack
edges. It is interesting to see that the advantage of using our
perturbation mechanism is less in Figure 15(b), as compared
to Figure 15(a). This is because the mixing time of the
Facebook friendship graph is much better (as compared with
the the mixing time of the Facebook interaction graph). Thus
we conclude that our perturbation mechanism improves the
overall Sybil detection performance of existing approaches,
especially for interaction based topologies that exhibit rela-
tively poor mixing characteristics.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed a random walk based pertur-
bation algorithm that anonymizes links in a social graph
while preserving the graph theoretic properties of the orig-
inal graph. We provided formal definitions for utility of a
perturbed graph from the perspective of vertices, related our
definitions to global graph properties, and empirically ana-
lyzed the properties of our perturbation algorithm using real
world social networks. Furthermore, we analyzed the privacy
of our perturbation mechanism from several perspectives (a)
a Bayesian viewpoint that takes into consideration specific
adversarial prior, and (b) a risk based view point that is
independent of the adversary’s prior. We also formalized the
relationship between utility and privacy of perturbed graphs.
Finally, we experimentally demonstrated the applicability
of our techniques on applications such as Sybil defenses
and secure routing. For Sybil defenses, we found that our
techniques are of independent interest.
Our work opens several directions for future research,
including (a) investigating the applicability of our techniques
on directed graphs (b) modeling closed form expressions
for computing link privacy using the Bayesian framework,
and (c) investigating tighter bounds on  for computing
link privacy in the risk based framework, and (d) modeling
temporal dynamics of social networks in quantifying link
privacy.
By protecting the privacy of trust relationships, we believe
that our perturbation mechanism can act as a key enabler for
real world deployment of secure systems that leverage social
links.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1: Relating vertex utility and mixing
time
We now sketch the proof of the above theorem. From the
definition of total variation distance, we can see that:
||P tv(G′)− pi||tvd ≤ ||P tv(G′)− P tv(G)||tvd + ||P tv(G)− pi||tvd
(16)
From the definition of mixing time, we have that ∀t ≥
TG():
||P tv(G′)− pi||tvd ≤ ||P tv(G′)− P tv(G)||tvd +  (17)
Substituting t = τG() in the above equation, and taking
the maximum over all vertices, we have that:
max
v
||P τG()v (G′)− pi||tvd ≤ max
v
||P τG()v (G′)−
P τG()v (G)||tvd + 
max
v
||P τG()v (G′)− pi||tvd ≤ V Umax(G,G′, τG()) + 
(18)
Finally, we have that:
τG′(+ V Umax(G,G
′, τG()) ≤ τG() (19)
B. Proof of Theorem 2: Relating vertex utility and SLEM
We now sketch the proof of the above theorem. It is known
that for undirected graphs, the second largest eigenvalue
modulus is related to the mixing time of the graph as
follows [1]:
µG′
2(1− µG′) log(
1
2
) ≤ τG′() ≤
log n+ log( 1 )
1− µG′ (20)
From the above equation, we can bound the SLEM in terms
of the mixing time as follows:
1− log n+ log(
1
 )
τG′()
≤ µG′ ≤ 2τG
′()
2τG′() + log(
1
2 )
(21)
Replacing  with +V Umax(G,G′, τG()), we have that:
1−
log n+ log( 1+V Umax(G,G′,τG()) )
τG′(+ V Umax(G,G′, τG())
≤ µG′ ≤
2τG′(+ V Umax(G,G
′, τG())
2τG′(+ V Umax(G,G′, τG()) + log( 12+2V Umax(G,G′,τG() )
(22)
Finally, we leverage τG′( + V Umax(G,G′, τG()) ≤
τG() in the above equation, to get:
1−
log n+ log( 1+V Umax(G,G′,τG()) )
τG()
≤ µG′ ≤
2τG()
2τG() + log(
1
2+2V Umax(G,G′,τG()
)
(23)
C. Proof of Theorem 4: Bounding Mixing time
Observe that the edges in graph G’ can be modeled as
samples from the t hop probability distribution of random
walks starting from vertices in G. We will prove the lower-
bound on the mixing time of the perturbed graph G’ by
contradiction: let us suppose that the mixing time of the graph
G’ is k < τG()t . Then in the original graph G, a user could
have performed random walks of length k · t and achieve a
variation distance less than . But k · t < τG(), which is a
contradiction. Thus, we have that τG()t ≤ τG′().
We prove an upper bound on mixing time of the perturbed
graph using the notion of graph conductance. Let us denote
the number of edges across the bottleneck cut (say S) of the
original topology as g. Observe that the t hop conductance
between the sets S and S is strictly larger than the corre-
sponding one hop conductance (since S is the bottleneck
cut in the original topology). Thus, E(G′) ≥ g. Hence the
expected graph conductance is an increasing function of the
perturbation parameter t, and thus E(τG′()) ≤ τG().
D. Proof of Theorem 5: Relating utility and privacy
From the definition of maximum vertex utility, we have
that |P lAB(G)− P lAB(G′)| ≤ V Umax(G,G′, l).
Thus, we can bound P lAB(G) as follows:
P lAB(G
′)− V Umax(G,G′, l) ≤ P lAB(G) ≤
P lAB(G
′) + V Umax(G,G′, l) (24)
Thus for any value of k, if P kAB(G
′)−V Umax(G,G′, k) >
0, then we have that the lower bound on the probability
P kAB(G) > 0, which reveals the information that A and B
are within an k hop neighborhood of each other. Thus the
maximum information is revealed when the value of k is min-
imized, while maintaining P kAB(G
′)−V Umax(G,G′, k) > 0,
i.e., k = δ. This gives us a lower bound on the probability
of A and B being friends in the original graph: the prior
probability that two vertices in a δ hop neighborhood are
friends: f(δ). Let mδ denote the average number of links in
a δ hop neighborhood, and let nδ denote the average number
of vertices in a δ hop neighborhood. In the special case of a
null prior, we have that f(δ) = mδ/
(
nδ
2
)
.
